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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ST Al~~ OF UT AHr 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent~ 
MACK MERRILL RIVENBURGH, JR., 
and LEONARD WARNER BO\VNE, 
Deferulants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPOKDEKT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9089 
Respondent agrees with many of the facts set out in 
Appellant Bowne's brief, but deems it necessary to take 
exception to certain parts thereof, and to add other per-
tinent facts necessary to a clear understanding of the 
case. 
Rivenburgh told Bo\vne be planned to kill Verner 
by cutting off his head (or that Verner should have his 
head cut off}. T. 220-223, 574~576t 790-691~ 815-818, 832t 
865. Bowne joined in the planning. Several methods of 
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killing Verner were discussed, including shooting him in 
the arm with oil. T. 246. Randel tried to talk Bowne out 
of having any connection with the murder~ T+ 247. The 
pretense of sodomy was only a trick used to get Verner 
to the attic .. T. 815.. The defendants went separately to 
the attic and together killed Verner-Bovrne holding Ver-
ner in a headlock or a scissor hold during the stabbing 
by Rivenburgh. T.350t364t 372~ 379t380t709~ 807. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
(Rivenburgh) 
THE VERDIC"f CONFORMS TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
(Rivenburgh) 
THERE IS NO PROOF THAT rfHE JURY 
IN ITS DELIBERATION \VENT OUTSIDE THE 
EVIDENCE AND TOOK INTO CONSIDERATJOX 
THE OPENING STATEI\iENT OF COUNSEL~ 
FOR APPELLANT BOWNE. EVIDENCE WAS 
ADDUCED TO SUPPORT SAID STATEIVlENT. 
IF ERROR \VAS CO:\IlvTITTED~ lT WJ\S NOT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR li\ LIGHT OF ALL THE 
CIRCUMST AI\ CES. 
POINT III 
(Rivenburgh) 
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION A~SKED 
DR. CLARK V·l AS EN'T lREL "'\r PROPER AND 
ITS ADMISSIO~ DID NOT COJ\STITUTE RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR. 
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POINT IV 
(Bowne) 
APPELLANT BOWNE WAS NOT DENIED 
DUE PROCESS l~I\TD~R THE FEDERAL OR 
STATE CONSTITUTIOK; HF: WAS NOT DE-
NIED A FAIR A)JD I~VIPARTIAL JURY; HE 
WAS NOT DEl\TIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE LA \VS; NOR DOES SECTION 77-30-2t 
UTAH CODE Al\"N01~ATED 1953~ VIOLATE 
EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE- CONSTI-
TUTION. 
POINT V 
(Bowne) 
THE TRI.AL COURT DID ~OT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING BOWNE~S MO-
TION FOR A SEPARATE TRIAL. 
POINT VI 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN KOT 
GRANTING BOWNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
POINT VII 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IK 
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15. 
POINT VIII 
(Bovvne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
crv·r~G IXSTRUC'TION 1\0. 26. 
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POINT IX 
(Bo-wne} 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO Gl\1 E BO\\il\E~S TKSTRUCTION 
NO. 13+ 
POIKT X 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GRA?\J"T A NEW TRIALr 
POINT XI 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO 
FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS AND COPIES 
OF STATE:\·fE~rrs MADE BY WITNESSES AND 
DEFENDANTS. 
POINT XII 
(Bovme) 
THE TRIAL COU·RT DID NOT ERR I~ RE-
FUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
THE CHA.RACTER A.ND REPUTATION OF THE 
DECEASED. 
ARGUMENT 
POII\!T I 
(Rivenburgh) 
THE VERDIC'T CONFORidS TO THE> 
EVIDE~CE. 
The general rule in this state is expressed in State 
v~ Priestley, 97 U. 158, 91 P., 2d 447, to the effect that 
jurors cannot impeach their verdict except in instances 
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expressly made exceptions by legislative enactment. In 
Section 77-38-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953~ seven grounds 
for a new trial are given, one of them being: 
ll ( 6) When the verdict or decision is con-
trary to law or evidence.~~ 
This subsection is relied upon by Appellant Rivenburgh 
at Point I of hls briefr 
Respondent believes that the affidavits submitted by 
Rivenburgh are of no consequence and in fact cannot be 
used to buttress his argument that the verdict "ras con-
trary to the evidence. This is for the court alone to de-
tennine and lay jurors can add nothlng whatsoever by 
affidavit or otherwise to a proper consideration of this 
problem. 
As a matter of factt it appears clear that the only sub-
sections of Section 77-38-3 as to which jurors' affidavits 
or testimony could be of any use are (2L (3) and (4), re-
lating to evidence received out of court; to situations \~·here 
the jury has separated without leave of the court after 
retiring for deliberation~ or where misconduct has occurred; 
and to situations where the verdict has been determined 
by lot or means other than a fair expression of opinion by 
all jurors. Any statements or evidence prepared or given 
by jurors :J s to the other four subsections of the statute 
would be completely immaterial. 
Rivenburgh"s defense rests on his n1ental condition 
after having swallowed what he alleges were a great many 
amphetamine pills, commercially knoWl'l as Drinalfas. The 
jury did not choose to adopt this theory and apparently 
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concluded that Rivenburgh was able to form the intent 
necessary to commission of first degree murder~ 
The jurors must have believed either that Riven-
burgh did not take the dosage claimed, or that Dr+ Clark's 
testimony proved that what he did take was not enough 
to prevent his :forming the intent necessary to commit the 
act. Disregarding for the present any belief the jury may 
have had as to the number of pills consumed by Riven-
burgh immediately prior to the killing~ respondent will 
turn to a consideration of what was in evidence as to the 
effect of the drug. 
At page 4 of his brieft Rivenburgh quotes from Dr. 
Clark's testimony, skipping here and there and taking only 
short fragments~ It would seem advisable~ therefore, at 
this point, to set forth additional excerpts from the tran~ 
script for the use of the court. Rivenburgh quotesr at page 
4 of his brief~ the statement of the doctor that he had had 
no experience with a certain dosage of amphetamine over 
a seven-hour period~ Since Dr. Clark vvas an expert wit-
ness, he v.~as not limited to his own observations~ but could 
testify on \Vhat he had learned by study Webb v~ Olin 
lJfathieson Chern. Co., 9 U~ 2d7 27:3, 342 P. 2d 1094t and 
through conferences with other doctors~ At page 463 of 
the transcript, Dr. Clark states as follows: 
·;on the <)ther hand, the stimulant drugs:t a 
stimulant can do so much, so to speak, and the ad-
dition of even a major increase in the dose \vill 
commonly not produce all of that additional effect. 
ul had a talk with Dr. Winkler a year ago, in 
which we talked about some of his workj with 
amphetamine and he pointed out that by slowly 
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raising the dose. one could get up to 1400 milli-
grams a day, without seriously disorganizing the 
individual~ 
''We were discussing the question of tolerance 
development, and effects, and that actually it was 
quite possiblej if one had the courage~ that you 
could take t-you for instance and give you 1400 
milligrams right now-
~'Q. I don~t have that much courage. 
~~A~ It might not produce delirium~ It might 
kill you~ or might produce only the same effect as 
a fairly modest dose, but no one has dared to do 
such an experiment.'~ 
Dr. Clark's testimony continues at line 22, Tr 445: 
'~Q. Now is his behavior more important to 
you in arriving at that conclusion. than knowing 
the amount of Drinalfa he had taken during this 
period? 
1
'-L\. The behavior is all tha.t \-ve have to judge 
by, and it would be more important than knowing 
the preci~e dose, in that there is evidence~ for ex~ 
ample~ that even a very massive amount could 
have been taken~ and no delirium occur, which we 
cited instances on.'' 
Important answers are given regarding large dosages 
at T. 433: 
l~Q. Do you know of any instances or case 
hi stories~ where· large doses of this has been used? 
~'.._!\_. Yes. There arc cases reported of the 
gestation of 250 milligrams a day for long periods 
of time. One -case is 700 milligrams a day for several 
months, one of 250 per day for G yearsr The com-
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mon dose use by addicts is about 200 or 250 milli-
grams a dE-y. 
''Q. So that on this 700 per day, it would be 
approximately-! believe you said 700 milligrams 
per day; is that correct? 
~"Ar Yes~ this is citing amphetamine, which is a 
closer related drug. 
'"Q+ Th~t would be 350 of these pills per day: 
is that correct? 
'"A~ If my arithmetic is right, 5 grams into 
700----5 milligrams into 700 would be 140. 
~ 'Qr That is 140 of these tablets in a day; is 
that correct? 
'·Q. Can you tell us what effects were ob-
served on these particular case histories? 
"~A~ These cases were cited to illustrate the 
remarkable tolerance of these drugs which can de-
velop. I am not familiar with the actual behavior 
of these individuals during this time. But they are 
not incompatible with their functioning re-dsonably 
'veil in terms of work~ etc. 
''I have personal experience of addicts who 
have taken this amount of drugs and functioned 
relatively 1..vell. 
~tHo\vever, it is cited that at the end of this 
prolonged ad diction, there did occur} a toxic rea c-
tion to the drug whereby their behavior became 
disturbed~ 
~~Q~ In these three cases you cited, how long 
a period did they take them? 
'"A.. One case cited 250 milligrams a day for 
five years, the other 700 milligrams a day for 
several monthE~~' 
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At page 5 of his brief. Rivenburgh quotes a state-
ment of Dr. Clark (T+ 442) to the effect that, HYes, I \vould 
say that amphetamine does alter mental state, changes 
self-awareness~'' etc. HoweverJ at T. 475, the following 
colloquy occurs~ with the questions being asked by Mr .. 
Banks: 
,:'Q. Doctor=- would a person~s behavior change 
to a point~ v.."hile· he is under the influence of Drin-
alfa~would it change to a point he would do some-
thing, under that influence, \Vhich he \vould not do 
under circumstances when he had not taken the 
Drinalia? 
"'A. No:r I would not expect it.H 
At T .. 442~ the following question8 and answers occur: 
~ 'N O\.v \vi th reference to the mental processes~ 
as to destroying men tal processes~ lNould there also 
have to be toxic delirium present? 
~~A+ I do not like the 'vortl ~destroy', because 
to met thi~ implies a total obliteration of functions. 
~~Q. Let us use the \Vord 'impair'~ doctor+ 
~'.l\__ Yes. I would say that amphetamine does 
alter mentul state~ changes self-awareness~ gives us 
an increased feeling of alertness, etc. but so far as 
producing a di~turbance that "\vould disrupt the 
\Vholc pattern of the individual's behavior) this 
would not occur, unless there wa.s occurrence of 
delirium.~, 
Furthermore~ at T. 470~ Dr. Clark states as follows: 
~'A. 1\ ... o, sir, I cannot agree "\Vith this ~t.ep­
wise thing you describe. The experimental ""',.ork I 
have done 'vith these drugst where one was testing 
a specific thing of controlling \V hat one \Vas saying, 
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I found that all of the drugs I studied, up to the 
point that the individual became unconscious, he 
was able to perform extremely well in the express 
measures I was using~ which involved ego control 
or the control of what one said or did not say, and 
I could cite these details if you V\' ish.'~ 
In answer to a hypothetical question, utilizing the facts 
of the case introduced in evidence but not assuming any 
specific amount of amphetamine taken by Rivenburgh) Dr. 
Clark testified at T ~ 444, that doing such acts as were in-
dicated by the question would not mean that the ampheta-
mine he had taken had impaired his mind to the point of 
destroying his ability to determine the difference between 
right and wrong. 
On redirect examination!f Dr~ Clark at T+ 475 states 
that even though a person does perform a spur-of-the~ 
moment actionr it does not mean that he does not know 
what he is doing+ At T~ 438, Dr. Clark says that short of 
toxic deliri urn the brain process is not disturbed by the 
use of the pills nor is it impaired. He further states that 
amnesia does not derive from use of the drug nor does the . 
drug have any particular effect either to stimulate or sup-
Press sexual desires. 
Rivenburgh's own testimony as to the events \vhich 
occurred prior to, at the time ofJ and after the killing is 
cleart comprehensive, and precise as to details. This alone 
should completely ans,Ner the allegation that he was not in 
control of his faculties. Rivenburgh knew on the day of 
the murder and knew at the time of the trial exactly what 
was happening at the crucial times~ His acts were pre-
n1 editated and were not the result of taking the pills~ 
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Thi~ is shown by the following excerpt from the tran-
script~ beginning at line 17, on page 634: 
(By Mr. Banks.) 
Q. But it was the pills causing your action 
Sunday? 
A. Pardon me, sir? 
Q. That it was the pills causing your action on 
Sunday? 
A. I just got mad~ sir~ 
Q. You knew what you "r.rere doing Sunday, except 
when you got mad? 
A. I believe I did, yes; at least I think.?? 
Furthermore~ Rivenburgh had been on the pills, ac-
cording to his own testimony (his brief, page 12) ever 
since June. t"fhus, he had managed to build up a great tol-
erance for them and the 55 to 60 pills he claims he took~ 
if in fact he did take them (T. 520);t could have had no-
u.--here near the effect on him as upon one not accustomed 
to regular use. 
Here there was overwhelming evidence that Riven-
burgh was not so affected a~ to be unable to form the 
necessary intent. 
Nor, can Rivenburgh, not having introduced expert evi ... 
dence at the trial to combat Dr. Clark"'s statements, now 
present to the court for the first time on appeal exc-erpts 
from medical texts as he has presumed to do in his brief 
at pages 14 through 17. 
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POI~T II 
(Rivenburgh) 
THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE JURY 
IN ITS DELIBEHATIO~ WENT OCTSIDE THE 
EVIDENCE AND TOOK TKTO CONSIDERATIO~ 
THE OPENING STATEMENT OF COT~NSEL 
FOR APPELLANT BOVVNE. EVIDENCE WAS 
ADDUCED TO SUPPORT SAID STA'fEM.l£1\~·r. 
IF ERROR WAS CO:t.·1MITTED, IT WAS NOT 
PREJL'DICIAL ERROR IN LIGHT OF ALL THE 
CIRCUSISTANCES. 
Bowne attempted to show that he feared Rivenburgh 
enough to do what Rivenburgh demanded of him. While 
he did not testify in full detail as to Mr~ Hansents com~ 
ments at page 18 of Rivenburgh .. s brief, Bowne did testi-
fy that he performed all the acts asked of him or demand-
ed of him by Rivenburgh relating to such things as stand-
ing point, coming to assist him and attempting to find his 
knifet and in establishing an alibi to help him. Such ref-
erences are numerous and appear among other places at 
T. 582, 590, 693, 694, 699, 710~ 721, 726~ 733t 735~ 792, 834, 
839 and 843. 
~Ir. Hansen's comments were not evidence and were 
not so regarded by the jury .. 
Rivenburgh could not possibly have been hurt by any 
failure on the part of Bowne to produce evidence con-
cerning matters in Mr. Hansen's opening statement+ Quite 
to the contrary~ any omissions definitely 1.vere in his fa-
vor. Additional evidence of compulsion on the part of 
Rivenburgh and fear on the part of Bowne would only 
have increased the jury's belief as to Rivenburgh~s guilt .. 
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Furthermore, Rivenburgh's counsel did not object to 
Mr. Hansents statement nor request an instruction for the 
purpose of curing the supposed error. It is, of course:t not 
error for the court not to give an instruction where it is 
not asked. State v. Peterson~ 121 U. 229, 240 P+2d 504. So 
much of a derogatory nature was adduced as to Riven-
burgh that any affect Mr .. Hansen's statement might have 
had would have been insignificant. Therefore, if error did 
occur :t it did not constitute reversible error. 
POINT III 
(Rivenburgh) 
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ASKED 
DR. CLARK \Vl\S E.r\TlRELY PROPER AKD 
ITS AD:\liSSIOK DID 2'JOT CONSTITT_~TE RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant Rivenburgh makes many objections in his 
Point IV to the hypothetical question presented to T ~ 444 
and 445~ but does not go into any of them in detail:r nor 
does he present law supporting themr 
The fairness of a hypothetical question is largely a 
matter resting in the discretion of the tria 1 court j \vhose 
ruling thereon vlill not be grounds for reversal in the 
absence of a shovnng of abuse· of such discretion. Martinez 
v+ People, (Colo.), 235 P.2d 810. 
Respondent believes Rivenburgh's argument can be 
answered fuJly by pointing out that the district attorney 
asked t\\.'O hypothetical questions;. each eliciting a separate 
answer from Dr~ Clark. To the first question and answer, 
beginning at T~ 444, Rivenburghts counsel did not object 
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and therefore waived any objection he might have hadr 
Even if the court, despite Dr. Clark's answer at line 23 of 
T. 444, should regard the hYJJothetical questions _as a single 
question, however, the objections of Rivenburgh are not 
\vell taken. The only ground there relied on is that no 
mention was made of the amount of amphetamine 
consumed. 
The contention of counsel for Rivenburgh that the 
hypothetical question was based on facts not in evidence 
is not true. With possibly one minor exception, all were 
clearly in evidence before the question was asked~ The 
following references are only a few of many showing this 
in the transcripL 
As to securing a knife or knives~ see T. 225, 307, 344 
and 423. 
.. 
As to a disguise (for example:P using someone else~s 
clothes)t see T~ 224 and 357. 
As to change of clothing~ see T. 2241 346 and 357. 
A~ to preparations for and the actual attempt to sever 
the head of the victim, see T~ 221~ 350 and 360. 
As to the death of the victim, see T. 146 and 366. 
As to the destruction of clothing~ see T. 240j 368 and 
390. 
As to the creation of an alibi:r see T. 257~ 343 and 393. 
Respondent has not found testimony introduced prior 
to the asking of the question relating specifically to the 
cleaning of Rivenburgh~s shoes; but againj no objection 
to the question \vas:i made on this or any other ground and~ 
the ref ore~ it is waived. 
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The other contentions of Rivenburgh~s Point IV are 
Vli.thout merit and have been answered heretofore in thi...;; 
briet 
POINT IV 
(Bowna) 
API>ELLANT BOWN ~ WAS NOT DE:.: TED 
DUE PROCESS TT~DER TJI:C FEDERAL OR 
ST 1\ TE CONSTITUTION; HE \VAS NOT DE-
N IED A FAIR AI\TD IMPARTI ... ~L Jl.TR\'; HE 
,~lAS NOT DEI\IED EQUAL PROTECT! OX OF 
THE LA \VS; KOR DOES SEC~"fiOJ\ 77 -30-2~ 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, VIOLA..TE 
EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTI~ 
TU!fiON. 
Appellant Bowne does not present a strenuous argu-
ment for either his due process of law or fair and impartial 
jury theories but does seem to lay great stress upon the 
matter of equal protection of the laws~ 
As to the question of denial of due process of la\v 
under the Utah Constitution~ this court has held in 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U~ 1~ 163 P.2d 3141 that the 
essentials of due process are: 
'"* * * {a) the existence of a competent person. 
body~ or agency authorized by la\v to determine the 
questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the 
question by such person, body, or agency; (e) no-
tice to the per~on of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at \Vhich such person 
should appear if he wishes to be heard; {d} right to 
appear in person or by eounsel; ( e} fair opportunity 
to submit evidence~ examine and cross-examine 
witnesses: (f) judgment to be rendered upon the 
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record thus made. In the absence of statute laying 
down other or more specific requirements:P the 
above conditions meet the demands of due pro-
cess.* * *~~ 
1n the same case the court said that while many attempts 
had been made to further define due process of law, all 
of them revolve around the idea that a party shall have 
his day in court4 
The case of Untermyer~ et al~~ v~ State Tax Comm.~ et 
atj 102 U. 2141 129 P.2d 881, held that since our due process 
clause is substantially the same as those in the Fifth and 
1\-ourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States, U~ S. Supreme Court decisions are to be 
considered highly persuasive by this court. 
With reference to the Federal Amendments, it has al-
ways been held that due process of law is not to be turned 
into a destructive dogma against the states in the admin-
istration of their system of criminal justice; and the pro-
cedure followed by the states shall not be held to violate 
the requirements of due process unless it violates the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and unless to 
continue it would vio 1 ate a principle of just ice so rooted 
iri the traditions and conscience of the people as to be 
ranked as fundamental. 16A C.J.S. 579, at page 623. 
The prosecution of crime is a matter for the individ-
ual states except for the limited scope of the federal 
criminal code; and the due process clause does not require 
that criminal procedure be uniform throughout the states, 
but each state can choose the methods and practices by 
which crime is brought to book as long as the ultimate 
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dignities of man assured by the· Federal Constitution are 
observed. Carter v~ People of State of Illinois, 67 S.Ct. 
216, 329 U. S. 173. 
A~ f~r as the Federal Constitution is concerned, due 
process of law does not in and of it~elf require jury trial 
at all in a criminal case; and the Federal Constitution 
does not prohibit the states from regulating and restrict-
ing the right of trial by jury in their own courts) as they 
may deem proper~ or in the manner in which states may 
select jurors, as long as the method employed does not 
exclude persons from jury service because of race~ color 
or previous servitude or does not violate ~orne principle 
of fairness deeply rooted in the courfs legal consciousness. 
16A C.J.S. 590, at page 655. Nor has any federal or state 
constitutional provision come to respondent's attention 
which by its terms or necessary implication would grant 
the defendant any peremptory challeng€~ at all. 
Rivenburgh and Bowne were tried in accordance with 
due process and the requirements of out statutes were 
fully met in every instance. 
Clear Jy.. in construing a statute, all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of constitutionality, General Electric v. 
Thrifty Sales ;o 5 U ~2d 326 ~ 301 P.2d 7 41. 
rrhat Bowne had a fair and impartial jury is shown 
by the scru.pulou~ care taken by Judge Jeppson in im-
paneling itr Hi:.-:; questioning~ aided by defense counsel, was 
exhaustive, covering the first 66 pages of the transcript. 
A reading thereof should Stitisfy the court that the jury 
could not have been anything other than fair and impartial. 
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Bowne lays great stress on what he claims amounts 
to unequal protection of the lawsr In this regard~ Bowne 
provides us, at page 9 of his brief, with a quotation from 
the case of People v. O'Laughlin, 3 U~ 153, 1 P. 653r The 
courtt after quoting the substance of the defendant's case t 
demolishes his argument in the next sentence with this 
statement: 
u+ • *This reasoning, although plausible and in-
genioust is not good~ * * * '~ 
There a defendant had a right to three peremptory chal-
Jenges and the court pointed out the absurdity of 13 de-
fendants receiving 39 peremptory challenges. 
That BolNlle's assertion is not the law in Utah is 
clearly shown by the court's holding is the case of State 
v. l'l emier, 106 U ~ 307, 148 P .2d 32 7. There three defend-
ants were tried for assault with a deadly weapon4 The 
eourt held that they were entitled to ten peremptory chal-
lenges but that they must be exercised collectively and 
that each defendant was entitled to two additional chal-
lenges \Vhich he could exercise separately. The court said: 
''* * *Where there are two or more defendants~ 
ihe :~ta tu te does not provide for additional separate 
challenges if defendants refuse to join in the col-
lective challenges.'' 
The court said that each ''side'~ should have an equal 
number of challenges. 
While the Utah court did not -concern itself with the 
con st.i tutionality of the act J this aspect of the problem has 
been considered by courts in other juris(lictions. 
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In the case of Muller v. Hale (Calit), 71 P. 81~ the 
court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which 
stated: 
~'Either party may challenge the jurors; but where 
there are several parties on either side~ they must 
join in a challenge before it can be made.u 
The court stated: 
~urhe appellant concedes that the ruling of the 
court was justified by t.he statute of this state, but 
contends that it violates the ft.,ourteenth A-mend-
ment of the Constitution of the TJnited States in 
that it denies persons equal protection of the laws. 
"\Ve see nothing in this contention~* * ~ ." 
It is true that this was a civil case~ but where the matter 
of equal protection of the laws is involved, there is no 
essential difference between civil and criminal rights. 
For example, in People v. Pitbol (Calif. L 260 P. 303j a 
criminal case 1 the court ex pres sly relied on the holding 
in the ~luller case and held that: 
''The requirement that defendants or parties must 
join in the exercise of peremptor~y challenges is 
not violative of any constitutional provision.'' 
The court also quotes from lfi Calif. Juris. 407, Sec. 79, to 
this effect: 
~~In criminal cases when several defendants 
are tried together, they cannot sever their chal-
lenges but must join therein. And in civil actions 
where there are several parties on either sidet they 
mu~t join in the challenge before it can be made. 
In construing these provisions, it has been held in 
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criminal cases that defendants must join in peremp-
tory challenges as well as in those for cause~ The 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not 
deny persons the equal protection of the laws, and 
thus violate the Fourteenth Amendment, for the 
same rule applies to all the parties to an action 
'vhere they are united with others either as plain-
tiffs or defendants/' 
In the case of Leback, et al v~ Nelson:~ (Idaho)~ 107 
P .2d 10 54~ the court, in dealing with a statute similar to 
that cited in the Muller case~ failed to find it offensive to 
the constitution. It is not an unreasonable classification 
to require defendants tried together to join in their per-
emptory challenges or take a lesser number thereof. 
It is interesting to note too that Mr. Hansen did not 
demand a formal ruling from the court on the matter of 
the challenges at the trialr 
POINT V 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID 1\'0T ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETIO='f IN REFUSING BO\-V2'JE~S ~-lOTION 
FOR ... -\ SEP ... ~RATE TRIAL+ 
Section 77-31-6 ~ U. C .A. 1953, reads as follo-w-s: 
~'\Vhen two or more defendants are jointly 
charged \Vith any offense~ whether felony or mis-
demeanor~ they shall be tried jointly, unless the 
court in it~ discretion on the motion of the prose-
cutin g attorney or any defend ant orders separate 
trials+ In D rd ering separate trialst the court may 
order that one or more defendant.~ be each separ-
ately tried and the others jointly triedt or may 
order that several defendants be jointly tried in 
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one trial and the others jointly tried in another 
trial or trials~ or may order that each defendant be 
separately tried. J' 
Judge Jeppson carefully considered the representa-
tions made to him at the time the motion for separate trials 
was made. He was~ of course, clothed \Vith wide discretion 
under the circumstances; and while it is true that a judge 
may not exercise his discretion in an arbitrary wayf a care-
ful examination of the transcript clearly indicates that the 
judge did not do so. 
In the case of State v+ Miller, 111 U~ 255~ 177 P~2d 727~ 
the court held that since an accused cannot demand sever-
ence as a matter of right, it must have appeared that the 
trial court had before it facts indicating the accused would 
be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial before the Supreme 
Court could hold it had abused its discretion. 
Contrary to the claim of Bowne, the defenses which 
he and Rivenburgh put forth, while somewhat different, 
to be sureJ were not antagonistic. There were no such 
circumstances as were reported in the case. of People v. 
Braune, (IlL), 2 N~E~2d 839, so strongly relied upon by 
Bovme at page 18 of his brief. There the court stated that 
in the petitions seeking separate trials., each defendant: 
~, * * * declared the other \vould take the 'v it ness 
stand and testify to a state of facts which would 
be exculpatory of the witness and condenmatory 
of his codefendant.n 
This is not true in the instant situation nor in fact 
did Bowne so allege in his motion for a new triaL Riven-
burgh at no time, as far as respondent can ascertain, ac-
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cused Bo1V11e of perpetrating the act nor did Bowne himself 
at any time attempt to urge that he· was not present at 
the scene. 
Even~ however, if each party had alleged that the 
other perpetrated the crime, the court still would have 
been on solid ground in refusing separate trials under the 
holding in Lucas v. U. S. 7 {D.C.), 104 Fed+2d 225! wherein 
the court said: 
~'* * *If the government had been compelled to try 
each separately, Johnson would have placed the 
blame on Lucas and Lucas on Johnson, and the 
probable result would have been an acquittal of 
both. In these circumstances it was "'Tithin the 
sound judicial disc ret ion of the trial court whether 
to grant separate trials~ + • • In examining the evi-
dence certified~ we find nothing which shows that 
either accused sustained any prejudice by the 
course adopted.Jt 
During the course of the trial both parties admitted 
their presence at the scene of the crime even though ad-
vised by separate attorneys at all times+ The evidence of 
both defendants \vas consistent in every substantial way 
under direct examination, each claiming the reason for 
bJ'Oing to the attic was the commission of an act of sodomy 
by Rivenburgh. 
It is true that the defenses were somewhat different~ 
Bowne~s turning on his denial of any implication in the 
act of killing and Rivenburgh's being based essentially on 
his taking of drugs, making it impossible for him to con-
trol his actions or to create the intent to commit murder. 
This difference, however~ did not make the defenses an-
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tagonistic to each other. The jury at all times was aware 
of the claims of the parties and undoubtedly treated them 
separately~ applying evidence l as indicated, to a particular 
individual and not to both indiscriminately~ 
Furthermoret a conspiracy was proven and thus~ the 
acts of one apply to the other. 
Bowne strongly urges that an abuse of discretion oc-
curred in the court's not proving separate trials for 
another reason, that isr alleged statements made by Riven-
burgh~s attorney to the effect that the defense set forth by 
Rivenburgh '~was the only defense in [the] case and if 
[they] didntt go along \Vith him in that defense, he would 
make first degree murderers of Jesse )1. Garcia, Jr. and 
Leonard Warner Bowne."~ 
This~ of course, cannot sensibly be construed as a 
genuine threaL Mr. Huntsman is a reputable member of 
the bar and~ of course~ would not make this statement in 
any other way than to show the importance and urge the 
adoption of his point of viewr It was merely the innocent 
use of colorful language~ To ascribe to this remark the 
nature of a genuine threat is totally absurd and at the 
very best a frivolous contention. 
Respondent cannot understand how the evidence as 
to the use of amphetamine drugs~ all of which related to 
Rivenburgh, could in any way have prejudiced Bowne. 
Furthermore, the evidence was adduced in his own defense 
by Rivenburgh and if it were thought by the jury to 
apply also to Bo~'Tiet it would have constituted a matter of 
defense for him too. 
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,.~t page 21 of his brief, Bowne points to certain testi-
mony applicable to Rivenburgh and inferentially suggests 
that it might have been applied improperly to BoVllle and 
be prejudical to him. Counsel for respondent has checked 
this evidence and has found that it did not relate even 
by implication to Bowne+ As to Rivenburgh's conversation 
-with decedent (Tr 498)t Rivenburgh admitted that Bowne 
was outside the cell where the conversation took place 
and seven or eight feet away~ nor was Bowne mentioned 
in the conversation set out at T. 511. As to Rivenburghts 
conversation with Dalton (T~ 513), Bowne was not men-
tioned~ Rivenburgh~s conversation with Dripps (T. 333)J 
related to standing point, something \vhich Bowne never 
denied doing. As to Rivenburgh's statement to Stark about 
a dead man in the attic {T~ 366), the court specifically 
admonished the jury that this statement was not to be 
considered as to Bowne at all. Nor is prejudice toward 
Bowne evident in any of the other statements. cited in his 
brief. 
Bowne points to the holding in State v~ Miller, suprat 
to the effect that the matter of separate trials should be 
decided upon any abuse which may have arisen at the 
time of the ruling and not on prejudicial error~ See People 
v. Friday~ {Calif.)t 63 P.2d 303. This would rule out~ of 
course~ the holding in People v. Fisher, (N.Y.), 164 N .E. 
3367 (Bownets Brief, page 22) and would make it unneces~ 
sary for the court to consider the specific points of evidence 
raised now on appeal. 
In the Friday case, which revolved around a similar 
statute to our Section 77-31..:6, U~C.A .. 1953~ the court said: 
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'~***Order for separate trial must be based upon 
some legal ground which satisfies the trial court 
that the regular procedure must be departed from." 
Bowne urges that any supposed antagonism between 
the defendants could not be overcome by proper admon-
itions or instructions to the jury,. made for the purpose of 
protecting the interest of each.. However, in the case of 
U.S. vr Gilbert, 31 Feel. Supp. 195, the court approved the 
trying of fifty~three defendants together in a mail fraud 
case and said: 
~~***The rights of each defendant can be care-
fully guarded by the trial judge in a charge to the 
jucy/' 
While~ as Bo\vne states (his brief, page 24), the 
question whether or not the trial judge has abused his 
discretion in refusing to grant a scpara te trial is a problem 
peculiar to each easel we do have enough holdings of 
neighboring state courts to give adequate guidance here. 
In the case of State v. Clark, (Wash+), 286 P~ 69,. prior 
to the beginning of the trial the appellant moved the court 
for a separate trial on three grounds~ summarized as 
follows~ 
(1) that evidence again~t the two was different; 
(2) that evidence might be admissable against one 
but not against petitioner and that such evidence would 
be pre judie al; and 
(3) that the interests of defendants ~'are or may prove 
to be antagonistic and adverse,'' that the parties could 
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not join in the selection oi a jury and that petitioner would 
be deprived of his proper challenges. 
The trial court denied the motion and was sustained 
on appeal. The Supreme Court pointed out that prior to 
the enactment of the statute involved, a defendant could 
demand a separate trial as a matter of right but that the 
new law made this a discretionary matter with he court. 
This circumstance is identical to that in Utah. The court 
mentioned that this was a most radical change .. It said 
that it had passed earlier on the question of separate trials 
'With the simple statement that ~~the question was one 
within the discretion of the tria I cou rL'' 
Then the court made the following holding, which 
applies directly to the instant situation: 
''$ * • The question arose again in Stllte v~ Ditrnar, 
132 Wash. 501~ 232 P. 321, and a similar ruling was 
made, although we there intimated that the dis-
cretion exercised might be the subject of review 
for manifest abuse. It is said~ howevert that the 
present case is distinguished from the cited cases 
in the fact that there is in the present case a show-
ing of nee essity for a separate trial, while in the 
cited cases there was not. But this fact cannot af-
feet the rule. \Vhile the showing may aid the court 
in the exercise of its discretion, it neither adds to 
nor Jimits its powers. The question is still one on 
which the court may exercise its discretion, and, if 
the manner of it~ exercise is reviewable at all~ it i.;; 
only so for manife:-1t abuse. 
''llut, conceding that the ruling may be re-
viev~red for the latter reason]" \Ve see nothing in the 
showing here made which would even indicate 
that a denial of a separate trial would amount to 
~n abuse of discretion. It would be difficult to con-
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ceive of a case where two or more persons are tried 
for the same crime in which some one or more of 
the conditions pointed out will not arise~ and, if 
they are to be regarded as requiring a separate 
trial, it is at once plain that the statute is rendered 
nugatory j and joint trials will be the exception 
and not the rule. But such was not the intent of 
the I_Jegislature. There were some real evils \Vhich 
the Legislature sought to correct by the change in 
the statute; the principle one, doubtle~S 7 being to 
lessen the excessive costs to the public which sep-
arate trials entailed. BuC be the intention what it 
may~ inasmuch as the Legislature has vested the 
right in the discretion of the trial court, there must 
be reasons more persuasive than those here shown 
before the reviewing court would be warranted in 
in t~rfering ~' ~ 
The California case of People v. Thomas~ 27 P.2d 765, 
says: 
'~We find no error in the trial court-'s ruling 
denying appellant's motion for a separate trial. 
Since the amendment in 1921 of sec:tion 1098 of the 
Penal Code (St. 1921l p. 90), defendants jointly 
charged are not longer entitled to separate tria Is as 
a matter of righL The granting or refusing of sepa-
rate trials now rests largely, if not \Vholly~ within 
the discretion of the trial court~ and it is well set-
tled that the ruling of the trial court denying a mo-
tion for a separate· trial will not be disturbed in the 
absence of a claim showing of an abuse of discretion. 
People v. Dowell~ 204 Cal. 109r 266 P. 807; People 
V~ P-erryj 1!15 CaL 623, 234 P. 890; People v~ Erno, 
195 Cay. 272~ 232 P. 710; People v+ Roderick, 118 
Cal.App. 457, 5 P~2d 463; People v~ Burdg, 95 Cal. 
App. 259, 272 P. 816; People v. Nelson~ 90 Cal.App. 
27, 265 P. 366: People v. Wilson~ 7G Cal.App. 688, 
245 P. 781; People v. Swoape, 73 Cal.App. 404, 
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242 P. 1067~ ~~ppellanfs motion was in \Vritten fonn 
and specified four grounds: (l) That idatlock~s 
confession would be introduced in evidence and 
would be prejudicia 1 to appellant; (2) that on a 
joint trial, appellant's right to exercise peremptory 
challenges '\\'ould be limited; (3) that each of the 
defendants had his own theory of defense and that 
said theories were conflicting; and { 4) that defend-
ants had recently qu(lrreled over their conflicting 
views on the conduct of the tria 1. Practically all of 
these grounds were urged in support of the motions 
for separa ie tria Is made in the cases a hove cited, 
but they were held insufficient to show ;1ny abu~e 
of discretion in denying the motions~ We find no 
abuse of discretion in the present case.'' 
Any ill \viii which may have existed between counsel 
for the parties is not of importance since each attorney 
had the opportunity fully to cross-examine statements 
made by the other defendant. As a matter of fact~ each of 
the attorneys cooperated carefully in helping bring out 
evidence from the other~s client on cross examination~ 
The IVIiller case, supra, held that where a proper 
motion 'vas timely made~ the failure to grant a severence 
on the grounds of confession of a codefendant was not 
prejudicial \vhere the court properly instructed the jury as 
to the use of the confession. 
Bo\vne~ rather than being hurt through being tried 
vvith Rivenburgh~ \vas instead greatly helped. Bo"rne un-
doubtedly appeared to the jury less culpable than Riven-
burgh \vhose callous disregard for humanity was so clearly 
evident throughout the trial, especially in hit-; O'Wll testi-
mony. The contrast bet\veen the parties could only have 
resulted in benefit for Bowne and this, of course, was 
shown in the jury's recommendation of :mercy for him. 
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1n the absence of a showing that the trial court has 
~dJused its discretion, the Supreme Court should not In-
terfere with its action in denying separate trials. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR L\l NOT 
GRA0J'T"l~C BOvV~E'S MOTION TO DIS\IJISS. 
(Bowne) 
The trial judge made the only proper holding in de-
nying Bowne's motion for dismissaL Thereafter, he wisely 
gave Instruction No~ 8, quoted by Bowne in his brief} 
properly ph-icing the responsibility for the determination 
of the facts of the case where it belonged~ on the jury. 
Then, as an added safeguard for Bo"WIJ.e, he gave Instruc-
tion No. 24:' as follows: 
~"In this caset the defendant Leonard Warner 
Bowne has made a motion to dismiss on the ground 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
verdict against himt which motion was denied by 
the court. 
~~You are instructed that said motion was de-
nied as a matter -of la\v ~ and in no \vay reflect.'-; the 
opinion of the Court relative to the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant, Leonard Warner Bowne~ 
You should not })e influenced either for or against 
said defendant, Leonard ''Tarner no"vne) because 
said motion \-va~ made or because it \Vas denied by 
the Court. Y()U are to decide the case on the facts.'t 
While it is true that the state has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is 
guilty, respondent believes th.ut Bo1Nlle has tortured the 
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law in claiming the judge was obligated to dismiss the 
action as to him+ 
If the court were to adopt Bowne:rs theory that when-
ever the evidence indicates a ''reasonable hypothesis :rt of 
innocence, the case should not be allowed to go to the 
jury at all~ normal criminal practice would indeed be 
stifled and perhaps eventually destroyed. Any defendant 
could be expected to conjure up evidence of such nature 
ag to constitute a prima facie "rea..~onable hypothesis'' of 
innocence and the state~s case would automatically dis-
solve. This is not the la-\V in Utah and such a conclusion 
would be absurd beyond belieL 
It is true that if the state were to fail to pro due e evi-
dence sufficient to make out the elements of the crimet the 
court would~ of course~ be justified in dismissing the com-
plaint. But that is not so here~ 
Our system of jurisprudence has from earliest times 
required that a jury of a man's peers find the facts of 
his case~ \Vith the law to be determined by the judge. It 
i;s the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine 
the facts in all criminal cases~ whether the evidence of-
fered by the state is weak or strongt is in conflict or is 
not controverted. Evidence may be ever so convincing 
that an accused is guilty of the crime c barged~ yet it is 
for the jury Bnd not for the trial judge to render the ver-
dict. State v. Green, 78 Ur 580, 6 P.2d 177~ 
Where there is .adduced~ in a criminal prosecution~ 
competent evidence from \vhich a jury can find beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant perpetrated the crime 
with which he is chargedt there can be no error in failing 
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to direct a verdict of acquittaL State v. Peterson~ 121 "C. 
229~ 240 P.2d 504~ 
As to the three questions· of motion to dismiss, motion 
for directed verdict and motion for a new trial, the court 
has recently spoken in the case of State v ~ Penderville~ 2 
U.2d 281~ 272 P .. 2d 195. The court said~ 
u* **It has been repeatedly held by this court 
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct .a verdict 
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial 
court does not consider the weight of the evidence 
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal propos it ion of Ia Vr~, \V heth er there is 
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, 
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in 
favor of the state. * * * As is pointed out in one or 
more of these cases, the trial court has a discretion 
in the case of a motion for a new trial that it does 
not have in case of a motion to dismiss or to direct 
a verdict of not guilty. 1\"':evertheless, in either case 
if there is before the court evidence upon which 
reasonable men might differ as to whether the de-
fendant is or is not guilty~ he may deny the motion .. 
Bowne uses the case of State v. Erwin, 101 U+365, 120 
P .2d 285, to say that if the facts relied on by the state are· 
not inconsistent with defendantts innocence~ it is esta~ 
l:ished as a matter of law. The court there affirmed the 
decision against appellant and went on to say this: 
~' * * * It is not necessary that each circumstance in 
itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the 
whole chain of circumstances"' taken together,. must 
produce the required proof. State v. Cra\vford, 59 
Utah 39, 201 P. 10~0; State v~ 11arasco, 81 l.Itah 
325, 17 P.2d 919; Terry v. United States]' 9 Cir~~ 7 
F.2d 28; State v~ Burch, Utah, 115 P.2d 911. 
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~~on the other hand, if there is any substantial 
evidence which satisfies the above requirements 7 
then the weight of the evidnce is for the juryt and 
the court will not disturb the verdi ct. State v. 
Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 22·6 P. 261; State v. Odekirk~ 
56 Utah 272, 190 P+ 777 ." 
The case of State v~ Lewellyn~ 71 U. 331, 266 P .. 261, 
was an adultery prosecution wherein defendant made a 
motion for a directed verdict. The same reasoning would 
.seem to apply to a motion to dismiss:P of course. The court 
there stated the following: 
'~In 16 C.J r 935~ the conclusions of various 
courts are condensed in the statement: 
'' 'As a general rule the court should direct a 
verdict of acquittal* * * where there is no compe-
tent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the 
charge; or ¥lhere the evidence js undisputed and 
so weak that a conviction would be attributable to 
passion or prejudice, or where it is so slight and 
indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set 
aside, n~ where the evi de nee consists solely of the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice~ or is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of inno-
cenee, or to ~hov{ defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. But the case should be submitted to the 
jury and the court should not direct a verdict of 
acquittal, if there is any evidence to support or 
reasonably tending to support the charge, as where 
it js sufficient to overcome prima facie the pre-
sumption of innocence, or where the evidence of a 
rna terial nature is conflicting. t ~ 
~'From Pace v. Commonwealtht 170 Ky. 560. 
186 S.W. 142, \\'·e quote the syllabus on this point 
as follows: 
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~~~It is only in the absence of any evidence tend-
ing to establish the guilt of the accused that the 
trial court will be authorized to grant a peremptory 
instruction directing his a cq ui ttal.' 
~~The same principle is decided 1n State v. 
Gross_. Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466. 
1
'An able discussion and determination of the 
bounds of judicial authority in considering a mo-
tion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v. 
U+S. 142 C.C.A+ 312~ 227 F~ 788~ in \vhich it is made 
clear that the court in su-ch case does not consider 
the weight of evidence· or credibility of witnesses 
but determines the naked legal proposition of law 
whether there is any substantial evidence of the 
guilt of the accused4 This is undoubtedly the correct 
rule+ See annotation ~n irecting Acquittal, t 17 A .L .R. 
910. The function of a court in dealing with an ap-
plication for a directed verdict must not be con-
fused with that in considering a motion for a new 
trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of evidence~ 
The court has a discretion in the latter case which 
he does not properly have in the former~ The reason 
for the distinction is that the order sought in one 
case acquits the accused and finally ends the pro-
secution, while in the othert the order~ if granted, 
does not di.Echarge the accused but merely gives 
hi.m the advantage and benefit of another trial. 
The rule i~ controlled by the same principles in 
criminal cases as in civil procedure. And in a civil 
case, Starn v~ Ogden P~ & P~ Co.t 53 Utah 248t 177 
P ~ 2.18, this court said: 
H 'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction 
and perhaps in nearly every other where the jury 
system prevails~ that~ if there is any substantial 
evidence whatever upon which to base a verdict, 
the court will not \vithdraw the case from the jury 
or direct what their verdict should be+' :t, 
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See also State v. Thatcher:' 108 Utah 63~ 157 P. 
2 258; and State v. lversun1 -Utah - decided by 
this court March 71 196 0. 
Counsel has presented a number of references to the 
transcript - each tending~ if unanswered~ to establish 
Bowne1S innocence. Perhaps standing alone1 they might 
constitute a reasonable hypothesis. Howevert whether it 
is reasonable must be determined by reference to the entire 
body of testimony given by both sides in the case. 
Because Bowne has set forth so many references to 
the trnnscri pt~ tending to substantiate his claim~ the state 
deems it necessary to refer to some, though by no means 
all, of the evidence tending to prove Bowne's guilt beyond 
any reasonable doubt. They will be set out in the chron~ 
ological order of the case. (References correlate with the 
small typewritten number at the top, right-hand margin 
of each page, rather than the larger stamped red number 
at the bottom .. ) 
T. 220-223: Billie Randel testifies to Rivenburgh's 
statement that he intended to kill Verner by 
cutting off his head and that Bowne was present 
at the time. Randel did not remember whether 
or not Bowne said anything at that time. 
T. 232~ Randel on hearing a scream goes to Riven-
burgh~s cell, indicating R:nowledge that Riven-
burgh's remarks had in fact been serious. 
T. 234: Randel goes to Bowne~s cell~ sees him try~ 
ing to stop the flow o£ blood from his leg and 
ha.;.; a conversation in which Bowne says he wa~ 
stabbed .. 
T~ 237: Randel tells of bloody knives being washed 
in Bowne's cell. 
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T .. 241: Randel testifies about blood on Bowne~s 
pants. 
T~ 246: At the time of the conversation about the 
impending murder, Randel testifies he ~ug­
gested shooting olive oil into the arm of Verner 
and BO\'-~ne 's reaction is sho\VIl by his statementt 
according to Randel, that Bo\vne had previously 
shot Verner in the arm. 
T. 247: The fact that Bowne was serious about 
Rivenburgh~s statement is shown by Randel's 
testimony that he cautioned Bo-wne not to have 
anything to do with the murder~ 
T. 287: Randel admits having made the following 
statement at the preliminary hearing: ''Warner 
said that he had walked over to this Verner and 
that Verner had kicked hlm and knocked him 
down, and that he grabbed his legs to keep him 
from kicking him againt and somebody had 
stabbed him in the leg.n 
T. 325~ Randel admits that he knew of only one 
previous occasion where a ~'point manu had 
been used in an instance of sodomy+ 
T~ 339-343: Harold Dalton testifies that Bowne 
came down from the attic covered with blood; 
that he proceeded to clean up and to receive aid 
for hiE leg. 
T~ 1;)0: Dalton n1akes an extremely damaging 
statement as follows: '(Bowne said he had his 
head [\.Ierner's 1 in a scissor~ lock, and his hand 
in his mouth, and pretty har(! to hold him 
duwn~t~ The testimony appearing at '"f. 548 is a 
c la ri fie a tion of this. 
T. 356: Robert L. Dripps testifies as to Bowne~s 
borrowing a knife and wrapping the handle. 
T. 362-363: Dripps tells of Bowne's taking bloody 
clothing off and washing himself+ 
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T. 364~ A very serious admission 1f Bovlllf · '3. i.~ ""'e-
ferred to by Dripps wherein - .owne says he had 
a scissor lock on the Po lock ""l v~ erner] . 
T. 366: Dripps quotes Bo'\vne as saying that Ver-
ner~s head hd.d almost been cut off. 
:-: T. 372: Dripps again quotes Bowne as follows: 
! -~ '"Well~ as I walked out Rivenburgh \Vas saying 
that the way his head wast it v.ras sure hard to 
eutj he had to sa"\V7 and Bo\Vlle said~ 'when I had 
that headlock un him he stabbed me with the 
knife~/' The court's attention is next called to 
lines 24 through 29 of this same page dealing 
with Bownet~ sticking his hand into the de-
ceased~s mouth .. 
T. 379-380: There appears here a clarification of 
previous statements as to Bowne's having a 
headlock or scissors lock on the deceased~ 
T~ 552: Rivenburgh testifies that after stabbing 
Verner, he called for assistance in finding his 
lrnife and that there was much scuffling and 
bumping on the floor as they attempted to find 
it. 
T~ 578: Rivenburgh testifies he got Bowne to put 
on different clothing than he normally wore. 
Tr 616: Rivenburgh testifies that during the strug-
gle- while Verner was still alive} Bo\Vlle was 
physically present. 
T. 651: Rivenburgh testifies he does not know 
v .. •hat llowne and Garcia were doing7 i£ anything, 
to Verner because he \va~ not paying any at-
tention. 
T. 691: Bo\vne testifies about Rivenburgh~s state-
ment about cutting off Verner's head~ 
1.,. 704: Bo"Wlle testifies that in looking for Riven-
burgh~s knife, he had contact with someone. 
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!. . 1\ 5709: 1.: )Wne admits that in a discussion at the 
prison ... ~r ~ .. had said that he had a headlock or 
scissor toe 1<: on V ernert s head with his legs. 
T. 736: Bowne admits having a knife in his hand in 
the attic~ .-, 
T. 744: Bowne admits throwing knives in the ~ink, 
changing -clothes and trying to stop his leg .J.. "f1m 
bleeding~ "-. 
T. 763: Bowne does not know ·~f he felt Verner at 
all and admits feeling blood. 
TL 772: Bowne is confused a~ to whether he hear .. ~. 
hollering or moaning. 
T. 781: Bowne admits having made a statement 
that he had expected there to be about 150 cuts 
in v·erner's body~ 
T. 807: Bowne admits that the previous day on 
direct examination he said that he previously 
made the statement that he had VemerJs head 
in a scissor lock. See also T. 860-862. 
T. 815-818: ~dr~ Banks quotes from an interrogation 
made previously which is set out in part: 
'~"\Vith the indulgence of the Court and counsel~ 
I will start over. 
MR. BANKS: I think there is only one answer you 
could give me that I couldn!t tell you on this thing~ 
and it puzzles me. 
MR. BOWKJ£: \Vha t is that? 
MR. BANKS: That is the takjng off of the clothes. 
MR. BO\VNE: You don't know that~ do you? 
i\.1R. FERRIS ANDR"CS: They vlere taken off vol-
untarily. If you are going to cut some body's head 
off~ I can :rt see this punki ng act coming in. 
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MR. BOWNE: All right. I will tell you something. 
Did you figure maybe that's just a way to get him 
up there?) 
QL Did you make that statement? 
A. If it is there"' I guess I did+ 
* * * 
~MR. B ... -\.KKS: 'Ve thought this out right from the 
start. In reflection we can look back and analyze 
it pretty well. That is the thing that confuses-with 
his pants off so neat:r and his shirt not tornt so he 
had to take them off voluntarily; the blanket in the 
attic and everything elBe. We couldntt understand 
it was going to be a quick job. We figured he was 
enticed up there for that specific purpose, but with 
the damn blanket rolled up that way~ and -with him 
on his back. 
WARNER BOWNE: It wa~ supposed to be a quick 
job. He said, ''As soon as I get up there I am going 
to kill him.'~ 
1\~R. BANKS: Mack said that~ 
MR. BOW:\l"E: Yes:P but he kept stalling and stalling 
and stalling~ He had the knife out there all the 
time+ I seen the knife~ 
FERRIS ANDRUS: How did he get started on 
him? 
WARNER BOWNE: Just ''Bangn, that~s it. That 
guy let out a holler, and boy, was he kicking and 
jumping all over. It sounded like a train driving 
through up there. 
W. L. ROBINSON: \r\There did he hit him first? 
1\.iR. BOWNE: I guess he hit him in the back. He 
was on the floor. 
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FERRIS ANDRUS: But he got him down ready 
for the punking and that is when he hlt him? 
MR~ BOWNE: Yes~ that is how the deal was~ yes. 
But "\Vhy didn't the guy start fighting sooner~~ 
Q. Did you make those answers to those ques-
tions? 
A+ Yes~ 
Q. I will ask you if the following questions were 
asked and if you made the following answers: 
MR. BANKS: Well~ I will tell you~ when we first 
started working with Billie~ we felt Billie was in on 
it) \ve really did. 
W ... -\H.J\ ... ER BOWNE: Boy, you were really wrong 
that time too~ because Billie \Vas pretty near the 
only one that went against him~ 
W+ L. ROBINSON: We soon realized that. 
WARNER BO"\VNE: He saidf "'"1vlack~ you are mak-
jng a mistake. You can't do that." He said, "''if you 
kill one stool pigeon'' he said '~there are 49 0 mote 
of them in here'~ and he said '~you can~t get them 
all, .so you might as well leave them alonen. He 
says, '~it is senselessB. He said ~'I am not going to 
tell you what to do, but I am telling you you should 
not do it~ there is no sense to it. I am not going to 
help you do iL ~~ 
Q. Did you make those ansvlers to those ques-
tions? 
A. l.{es. 1 ' 
T. 838: Bowne testifies he does not know what his 
intent was \vhen he opened his knife and start-
ed toward Verner and Rivenburgh. 
T. 850: There is much testimony about a possible 
alibi and about contradictory statements made 
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by Bowne as to Rivenburgh. Randel throughout 
his portion of the transcript, beginning at this 
page~ tells Eov.r~ne to blame it all on Rivenburgh. 
T. 858: Bowne admits that Randel did not cause 
him to make statements about having a scissors 
lock around Verner~s head. 
T. 866: Bowne suddenly remembers a portion of a 
conversation which he had not remembered pre-
viously invol\-"ing preparations for the commis-
sion of an act of sodomy .. 
T+ 875: Bo"\Vlle admits that he does not know 
whether there is any purpose for a point man 
or lookout man in the attic during the perpetra-
tion of an act of sodomy. 
T. 882: Bowne changes his story as to \vhether or 
not he \Vas able to see the participants in the 
struggle leading to Verner' bl death~ 
In light of the above evidence~ it is inconceivable that 
the court could have dismissed the infonnation as to 
Bowne for insufficient evidence. 
POII\T VII 
(Bo"WIJ.e} 
rrHr~ TRIAL COUTIT DID NOrr ERR IN 
GlVI);JG INSTRUCTION 1\:0r 15. 
1\:o error was committed by the court in giving In-
struction Nor 15. As far as pertinent~ the instruction reads 
as follows: 
.;'You are instructed that all persons concerned 
in the commission of a crime~ whether they directly 
commit the act constituting the offenset or aid and 
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abet in its commission) are principals in any crime 
so committed.***'' 
Bowne says the jury could have construed the terms 
~'a crime~' and .c'Any crime'' so as to refer to the act of 
sodomy. ThisJ of course, is untenable. 
In the first place the only reasonable interpretation 
of the court ~s instruction is that it applies to the crime 
charged and to whlch the jury was directing its sole atten-
tion .. Neither defendant was ever charged with the crime 
of sodomy. As a matter of fact, it was introduced into the 
case only by Bowne himself as a matter of defense. 
It would appear that Bo"Wne is dealing in semantics, 
intending to hang hls case on single words and phrases as 
against the entire instruction and, in fact~ as against all 
the instructions taken as a whole. In Bridges v4 U .. S., 199 
Fed .2d 811 ~ the court said: 
~ 4 * **Instructions given in a criminal prosecution 
may not be taken apart and a phrase here and a 
clause, or even a sentence or paragraph, there used 
to find error. :t ~ 
In People v. Marsh~ (Ill.), 85 N.E.2d 715, the court 
stated: 
'~***Accuracy in the use of language in an in-
struction containing a correct proposition of law 
would~ of course·:t be desirable, but it is not ulways 
obtainable+ For that reason we announced the role 
that it is s uffic ien t if the series of instruc lions, con-
sidered as a whole, fully and fairly announce the 
law applicable to the theories of the People and of 
the defendant, respectively. People v. De Rosa, 378 
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Ill. 557J 39 N.E.2d 1;People v. HichetteJ 324 IlL 1707 
155 N.E. 39. 17 
In Taylor v .. State~ (Okla.), 208 Pr2d 185~ it was held 
that even where it appeared that the instruction com-
plained of was .;'most poorly worded/~ but not misleading 
in light of all the instructions, it did not constitute revers-
ible error+ 
In State V~ Zeimer~ --- u+ ----' 347 P.2d 1111. decided 
January 5t 1960, the court treated a sintilar question where 7 
in an habitual criminal matter, the instructions referred 
\._ 
to the charge as an '~offense;r'H to the question of defend-
ant's ~ (guilt, J 1 and to the burden of proof necessary to 
u conviction/' There the court said: 
''While defendant is semantically correct, he 
is legally without reversible error because the in-
structions are not prejudicial. The jury was in-
structed upon the meaning of habitual criminal 
and upon the required elements and burden of 
proof." 
Furthennoret it is clearly the law in Utah that all 
instructions are to be considered together and construed 
as a whole~ State v. Evans, 74 U. 389~ 279 P. 950~ State v. 
HendrickB~ 123 U~ 267~ 258 P.2d 452. The jury in the instant 
case knew this was so by virtue of Instruction No. 31 
whjch states as follows: 
"These instructions are to be considered alto-
gether as a whole, and not as if each instruction 
were a complete statement of the law by itself~ ... !J...nd 
even though a rule, direction or thought is stated 
in different ways and repeated in more than one 
instruction you should not give it undue emphasis 
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and ignore others. But you should consider all of 
the instructions as a whole and apply them all to 
the evidence in the light of all of the instructions~ t' 
Considering all the instructions together, as we must 
do, any possible error is corrected by Instruction ='To. 6: 
'~There is some evidence in this case of the 
commission of other crimes. There is no crime 
charged, however, in this case except Murder. Tes-
timony of any crime not charged is not evidence 
that either of the defendants is guilty of Murder. 
,;~If another crime is connected with the alleged 
murdert you may consider said other crime as you 
would any other act relating to the alleged circum-
stances connected with the alleged murdeT.'] 
Bowne claims the jurors were biased and prejudiced 
against him for the reason that sodomyf "~the crime against 
nature,'t for which he claimed to have been a lookout~ is 
capable of engendering deep-seated prejudices against any-
one connected with it~ and says it would be difficult for 
the jurors to appreciate the fact that no one was being 
prosecuted for per"V"ersion~ Instruction No~ 7 would tend 
to eliminate this objection in stating: 
~'Prejudice, passion and sy1nputhetic fee1ingf; 
have rio place whatsoever in your deliberations. 
You should disregard all bias, prejudice, and other 
extraneous. influence~. * * *'' 
Of course, it is true that in this jurisdiction where no 
request is made, no error can be assumed to have occurred 
when an appropriate instruction is not given. 
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Even if error occurred, it was fully cured by all the 
instructions taken as a whole and there was no prejudicial 
error. 
POINT VIII 
(Eo \VIle) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I~ 
GIVING INSTRUCTION KO. 26. 
There is no merit whatsoever in Bowne's Point V. 
Only the most strained construction possible of Instruction 
No. 26 could lead to the misconception claimed to have 
resulted from it. No reasonable person could be misledr 
Bowne~s claim is too farfetched to warrant serious 
consideration. 
In the course of the trial~ the judge admonished the 
jury that certain evidence as to one defendant was not to 
be applied to the other~ The jury was well trained by the 
end of the trial.. 
Furthermore, Instruction No+ 11 should cure any de-
fect CI'e'"d ted by Instruction )I o. 2 6. Whenever counsel re-
quested the court to admonish the jury~ it did so; and if 
the parties failed to request proper admonitions or an 
instruction to cure any supposed defect it is too late now 
to complain~ 
Since admissions are nothing other than evidencet 
and stipulations are equivalent to evidence adduced by 
examination, the admonitions given by the court take 
<~are of the rna tter. 
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POINT IX 
(Bowne) 
THE TRI.c\L C01JRT DID NOT ERR Il\r RE-
FUSING TO GIVE BO\V::-JE'S I~STR.CCTION 
)10. 13. 
Bowne was fully and carefully protected by all of the 
instructions given in the case considered as a whole. This 
is all he could ask~ See reasoning at respondentts Point 
VII (Bowne). 
The attention of the court is called particularly to In-
structions )J"os. 2~ 6, 15, 16 and 21~ all of which considered 
together clearly cover Bowne's defense. It is~ of course, 
not necessary that his defense be stated in his own words 
if the applicable law is given the jury by the court. State 
v. Rosenberg~ 84 U. 402, 35 P.2d 1004. State v. Cox~ 106 U. 
253~ 147 P.2d 858. These words of Instruction No. 21 are 
particularly applicable: 
''You are instructed that in the event you find 
that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that a defendant intended to and did in fact 
commit the crime charged 7 or the included offense·, 
but that the State has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the other defendant ever did 
intend to paricipate in the killing_, or if you find 
that the State has failed to prove that the said 
other defendant committed the crin1e charged, or 
has failed to prove he committed the included of-
fense, you are then instructed to find said other 
defendant not guilty~ * * *n 
)I o error occurred here and certainly defendant suf-
fered no prejudice. 
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POINT X 
(Bown~) 
Generally speaking, the matter of whether or not a 
new trial should have been granted is for the trial court 
to determine and its holding will not be interfered with 
on appeal by the Supreme Court~ See the following cases: 
State v .. Montgomery~ 37 U~ 515, 109 P. 815; State v. Mellor~ 
73 U. 104r 272 P. 635; State v .. Cooper~ 114 U. 531, 201 P.2d 
764. 
Bowne assigns six reasons why the judge should have 
granted him a new trial. Respondent will treat them in 
the order set forth. (Bowne's brief~ page 37.) 
1. Bowne says a new trial should have been granted 
because of prejudice developed during the trial. This was 
discussed at Point II~ page 16J of his brief. The state~s 
ans,ver is contained in Point IV (Bowne) of this brief. 
2~ Bowne complains because the jury was separated 
during its deliberations in that the bailiff took several 
jurors at a time downstairB on an elevator to go to the 
restrooms. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the jurors 
talked with anybody except each other on this excursion 
and the fact that the elevator would not accommodate a 
dozen jurors and a bailiff without creating a dangerous 
hazard made it imperative that if they were to avail them-
selves of this means of transportation, and the des]red 
relief, they would have to be divided into two sections. 
This subject was considered in the case of State v. 
Jarrett, 112 U. 335~ 187 P .. 2d 5471 decided in 1947. There 
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it was held that an interpretation preventing jurors from 
separation for purposes of necessity would be an unreason-
able -construction of the statute. The court said: 
~~* * *The right of a defendant to have a jury 8e-
cluded from outside influences while deliberating 
should be jealously guarded. However, this right 
must not be founded on an unreasonable and an 
unwarranted eonstruction of a statute. The statute 
must be construed in regard to the correlative 
rights of the defendant and the jurors .. '' 
3 .. Bowne is concerned because early in the morning 
the bailiff informed the court that the jury was still dead-
locked. At that time a juror asked for an additional fifteen 
minutes defiberation before leaving for the hoteL The ex-
tension was granted. The jurors:P ten minutes later~ came 
in with a verdict of guilty~ Bovm.e urges that the verdict 
was reached by means other than a fair expression of 
opinion by all the jurors. This allegation is without proof 
and is based on a most flimsy premise. The circumstances 
do not even suggest the conclusion urged. 
In the case of State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973~ 
the court said: 
~~. * • Courts examine verdicts objectiveJy in the 
light of competency~ relevancy, and materiality of 
the evidence sufficienc~r of th-e cYidence. and fact-, ... . 
ors 1-vhich might tend to create prejudice or to mis-
lead a jury~ In reviewing records on appeal, V•/e 
assume~ unless the contrary be sho'vn~ that quali-
fied jurors have served~ and that the verdict re-
turned \vas in consonance with the oath which 
they, as jurors, took. 'rhe motion for new trial on 
the alleged ground of misconduct of the jury was 
properly denied.~' 
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In regard to thls and the preceding point~ the court said 
in Commonwealth v. Lombardi~ (Penn~)~ 70 A. 122: 
''$$."A trial really fair and proper should not be 
set aside for the mere suspicion or appearance of 
irregularities shown to have done no actual injury .tt 
If there was error~ it was not prejudiciaL 
4 .. Bowne says the court erred in allowing Jesse Garcia 
to take the witness standr It is true that Garcia was in-
volved in the events leading to the instant prosecution and 
that he was scheduled to be tried at the conclusion of this 
trial. Nor d0€s the state quarrel as to Garcia's absolute 
right not to testify. See Section 77~1-10, U.C.A. 1953. 
It is, however, the right of the defendant alone~ and 
not of counsel who happens to be representing another 
defendant in a case involving the same facts. The Riven-
burgh-Bowne case was an entirely different matter from 
the Garcia case. 
The district attorney sincerely desired the testimony 
of Garcia and had it been given, the state's case probably 
v.rould have been aided materially. Respondent believes 
there \vas no misconduct whatsoever on the part of Mr .. 
Banks. Ho,vever, mere misconduct of counsel is not 
grounds for reversal unless prejudicial enough to deprive 
a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Hoffa, (Iowa)~ 71 N .. W. 
235. Mr. Banks' actions did not truly constitute~ as sug-
gested~ a grandstand play for the jury with the effect of 
prejudicing the rights of Bowne. An indication of this is 
the statement of 11r. Banks at T. 503: 
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~~Jesse Garcia at one time told me he wanted 
to take the stand, your Honor.n 
It is extremely difficult to see how Bowne could have 
been damaged. The only statements made about Garcia 
whatsoever in the hearing of the jury are set out in full 
as follows: 
''MR. BANKS: We will call .Jesse Garcia.~t 
MR. HANSEr\: At this time I have substantial 
law to argue. Would you like it within or without 
the presence of the jury? 
THE COURT: We "\vill excuse the jury~~' 
(Proceedings held outside the presence of the jury.) After 
the conference: 
~"THE COURT: Call the jury. 
(Jury returned to courtroom and resumed their 
seats.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury the State called 
as its next witness Jesse Garcia~ 1·fr~ Garcia stands 
charged \~ll t h First Degree Nlurder ~ and the case 
has not yet been tried~ It is scheduled for trial, and 
he refused to testify on the grounds his testimony 
may incriminate him. 
The eourt did not insist that he testify. 
i\-IR_ HAl\1SEN: \Vould you further admonish the 
juryt your Honorf that I so advised him, in the 
capacity of his lawyer for the trial that is to follow, 
and not in the capacity of ~·1r. Bo,vne~s la\vyer in 
this trial. 
THE CO"CRT: Mr. Hansen states that he advised 
him, as his lawy·er, not to testify+ Is that sufficient? 
:.rlR. HANS"F~l\T~ AB Jesse Garciats lawyer~ your 
Honor. 
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THE COURT: Your next witnesst for the State. 
There is a constitutional right a man does not 
have to testify where it will incriminate him. 
MR~ BANKS: Counsel has indicated they would 
stipulate that Jesse Garcia is charged with Murder 
in the First Degree and that hls trial is set to fol-
low this triaL 
TilE COURT: Will you so stipulate, 1\IJr. Hansen? 
MR. HANSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. BANKS: Will you so stipulate, Mr. Huntsman? 
:rtfR~ HUNTSMAN: \~esJ your Honor .. ~' 
Garcia's actual refusal to testify was made in cham-
bers and out of the presence of the jury~ The court com-
mitted no error. 
5~ Bowne says that a new trial should have been grant-
ed because of the unusual order of the case .. The problem 
is complicated by the presence of two defendants whose 
defenses, ~:hile in no way antagonistic, were somewhat 
different. The court had wide discretion in the matterl 
however, 23 C.J.S. 1045. The judge was careful to give it 
the most orderly course possible,. to adduce all the relevant 
facts, and to secure fair play for all concerned. There was 
no error here. 
6. Bowne believes a new trial should have been or-
dered for the reason that the state failed to show a motive 
for Bowne's participatioll in the crime. He relies on People 
v. Tom Woo~ (Calif.>~ 184 P. 389. Respondent fails to 
see, however~ how this case can give Bowne much comfort 
since it clearly supports the state js position in the follow-
ing words~ 
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"~* * * But the presence or absence of motive is 
essentia11.Y a question of fact) and~ like any other 
fact, is not necessary to be provedj if the crime 
can otherwise be established by sufficient compe-
tent evidence~ So, in this case, the absence of proof 
of motive is a fact to be reckoned on the side of 
innocence; but, if the proof of guilt is nevertheless 
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of inno-
cence~ the appellants must stand convicted, not-
withstanding no motive has been shown.~' 
The California court adopted the holding of the Tom 
Woo case in People v. Isby, (Calif.), 186 P.2d 405~ de-
cided in 19471 and quoted extensively therefrom. 
In Morletti v~ People, (Colo~), 209 P~ 796, the court 
stated: 
''* * * It often happens that the motive for crime 
escapes the shrewdest investigator. If the jury is 
other-wise convinced beyond a reasonable doubt~ 
the absence of motive is no grounds for acquittaL~1 
In thls instance, Bowne's guilt was clear beyond ques~ 
tion and while the matter of motive was not explored in 
depth by the state~ it is of no importance. 
Some of the above grounds now set forth by Bowne 
were not mentioned in his motion for a new trial except 
possibly in the most general terms, and this is late in the 
day for them to be raised .. 
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POINT XI 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
F AILIKG TO COMPEL TH~ PROSECUTION TO 
F"CRNISH T .L\PE RECORDINGS AND COPIES 
OF ST A TElVI:ENTS MADE BY WITNESSES AND 
DJ:GFENDANTS. 
Jt is a discretionary matter with the trial judge as to 
how far a defendant should be allowed to go in the ex-
amination of notes, statements and recordings made prior 
to trial by the prosecution~ 
Herer the court~ for reasons satisfactory to itl' did not 
see fit to order the prosecution to give certain '~.rire record-
ings to Bowne~ However~ they were available for inspec-
tion by the defense and~ in fact~ were heard by counsel 
for both defendants, even though the recordings were 
not used in evidence. Copies of written statements were 
also provided for defendants' counsel.. 
Certain statements were used to impeach Bowne and 
he was asked whether or not he had made the statement.s 
and) in many cases~ he answered in the affinnative. If 
Bowne had told the truth all the way through from 
the beginning of the investigation to the end of the 
trial~ his testimony would have been consistent at all times~ 
and possession of the statements would not have been of 
any assistance to himr 
The judge did not en in limiting the scope of the 
production of documents in this matter~ He didt in factt 
order that a great many of the instruments~ writings~ 
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photographs} reports, etc.~ requested by Bowne, be given 
to him. If~ in fact~ there was error~ it was not prejudicial 
in light of all the evidence adduced during the course of 
the trial. 
POINT XII 
(Bowne) 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
THE CHARACTER AND REPUTATION OF THE 
DECEASED. 
It is true, of course, and there is no controversy about 
it;t that the character and reputation of the deceased gen~ 
erally is inadmissible as being immaterial.. Bowne cites no 
cases in support of his view that an exception should have 
been made here. 
While character evidence~ as the term is ordinarily con-
strued~ was not allowed as to Verner~ still, much testi-
mony was introduced to show that he was a depraved 
pervert~ that he had engaged in acts of sodomy according 
to both definitions of that term~ and that just the day before 
he had been misused by five inmates, including two 
negroes .. No evi.dence was given as to any possible decent 
characteristics the deceased might have possessed~ so 
there was no necessity for introduction of evidence to the 
contrary+ It is doubtful that any evidence of the type 
Bowne desired to use could in any \vay have further dam-
aged the character of the deceased~ or shown a greater 
tendency to commit sodomy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both appellantst Rivenburgh and Bowne~ were given 
a fair trial~ conducted v.rith scrupulous care by an expe--
rienced and capable trial judge before a fair and im-
partial jury~ The trial was conducted without prejudicial 
error. Appellants' appeal is groundless and the conviction 
of each should be affirmed~ 
Respectfully subnritted~ 
WALTER L~ BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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